David Kay Quotes (68 Quotes)

It was a realization that I hadn't gotten all the parts of Iraq's nuclear program. So there was a moment of regret, but there was also an exhilaration that now maybe we have a chance to take this to the very bottom.

I think that shows a level of maturity and understanding that I think bodes well for getting to the bottom of this. But it is really up to you and your staff, on behalf of the American people, to take on that challenge.

And like I say, I think we've got other cases other than Iraq. I do not think the problem of global proliferation of weapons technology of mass destruction is going to go away, and that's why I think it is an urgent issue.

I came not from within the administration, and it was clear and clear in our discussions and no one asked otherwise that I would lead this the way I thought best and I would speak the truth as we found it.

I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that.

didn't pass the laugh test.

It's not something that anyone from the outside can do. So I look forward to these hearings and other hearings at how you will get to the conclusions.

Kay said the United States was not alone in its prewar interpretation of Iraq's weapons capability. Although other countries' intelligence agencies differed on how serious a threat Iraq was and what course of action to take to mitigate it, there was very little difference around the world on the issue of 'Does Saddam have weapons' ... ' Yes, he did,' was the consensus.

That was because it is the main road to Baghdad from the south. It was a road that was constantly under surveillance. I also don't find it hard to believe that looters could carry it off in the dead of night or during the day and not use the road network,

And you know, almost in a perverse way, I wish it had been undue influence because we know how to correct that. We get rid of the people who, in fact, were exercising that.

I suspect there will be multiple reasons, and none of them the easy reason - someone simply distorted the intelligence, they were pressured - I don't think that's the answer. I think the answer is far more complex because other countries also came up with similar estimates, and indeed, the U. N. inspectors themselves when they left in '98 drew a very stark assessment of Iraq's WMD program. So it was a series of people who made errors, and I suspect it will turn out to be a series of errors and not a single one. But we won't know until we conduct the investigation that's required to find out that answer.

I'm afraid that we probably are past the point where there is any meaningful alternative other than military action to stop the Iranians if they are determined to go ahead. And I don't see that as a possibility.

It's important that it be outside the normal political process so it can have the maximum credibility,

I could see moving all of our power plants inland if we had widespread, convincing evidence that coastal plants are impacting (the ocean), but that's just not the case.

But the most important thing about that story, which is not often told, is that as a result after the Cuban missile crisis, immediate steps were taken to correct our inability to collect on the movement of nuclear material out of the Soviet Union to other places.

I do not think time is on our side in this regard, ... I'm convinced that if Saddam believes we're going in to end his rule, he will use WMD. I do not see any advantage to giving him additional time to prepare for that use of WMD against U.S. troops.

As leader of the effort of the Iraqi Survey Group, I spent most of my days not out in the field leading inspections. It's typically what you do at that level. I was trying to motivate, direct, find strategies.

On the other hand, they are important as a symbol of what happened in Baghdad as the military victory was completed,

Despite arduous working conditions and an inhospitable and often threatening environment, the ISG ... has performed its important mission with great skill and the utmost integrity, ... While there are many unresolved issues, I am confident that the ISG will do everything possible to answer remaining questions about the former Iraqi regime's WMD efforts.

We do, after all, have the case of A.Q. Khan, who, for 20 years, sold secrets of nuclear weapons production to countries around the world, ... It took about 18 years before we discovered it and managed to stop it.

The Iraqis had over two decades to develop these weapons. And hiding them was an essential part of their program.

We're taking steps to ensure we're all singing off the same sheet of music, ... Coordination is essential to the effort we're engaged in, and we have learned from our mistakes.

I had innumerable analysts who came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed and that they had estimated. Reality on the ground differed in advance.

But is it Even if inspectors return to Iraq with expanded powers, can they document, uncover and dismantle Saddam's full arsenal more completely than their predecessors (From 1991 to 1998, monitors found hundreds of tons of chemical agents, dismantled more than 800 Scud missiles and wiped out Saddam's budding nuclear program, but they didn't come close to uncovering everything.) The U.S. has even less confidence in inspections after a hiatus Saddam has had the past four years to hone his concealment skills. In eight years of efforts to uncover Iraq's stockpiles, we taught them what we could find, and they learned how to conceal, deceive and deny, ... is a lot smaller but a lot harder for us to ever have detailed knowledge of.

This was a program that over 25 years spent billions of dollars, involved 10,000 people, was actively shielded by a security and deception plan, ... It is not something that is easy to unwrap.

The Germans certainly - the intelligence service believed that there were WMD. It turns out that we were all wrong, probably in my judgment, and that is most disturbing.

If you want to know who makes nuclear weapons it doesn't do any good to pick people who have never made nuclear weapons. If you are interested in biological and chemical weapons or missiles, the same thing. The fact is, the Americans by and large have had the bulk of the experience in dealing with these weapons.

The weapons do not exist.

the intelligence community owes the president (an explanation) rather than the president owing the American people.

none of which make any logical sense.

The administration had almost no evidence for its claim.

Using the wow ... Kay said that his 'model' for the inquiry would be the special commission named by President Reagan to investigate the January 1986 explosion of the space shuttle Challenger shortly after it was launched.

It is very important to find out where they come from. I am not sure that's possible, but we have to understand why our process let them gain so much credence.

There's a long record here of being wrong. There's a good reason for it. There are probably multiple reasons. Certainly proliferation is a hard thing to track, particularly in countries that deny easy and free access and don't have free and open societies.

In my judgment, based on the work that has been done to this point of the Iraq Survey Group, and in fact, that I reported to you in October, Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of U.N.Resolution 1441.

We had some tough breaks down the line, ... I guess it was just being in the right place at the right time. We had a tough time at DB (defensive back) all night. We just finally came up big.

You pick inspectors according to their competence.

This hearing came about very quickly. I do have a few preliminary comments, but I suspect you're more interested in asking questions, and I'll be happy to respond to those questions to the best of my ability.

This is important for domestic support of the intelligence community and of our foreign policy. It's important for national security, and it's certainly important for our ability to lead other countries in the future against threats that we may think threaten us.

There is a lot of proof supporting the U.S. case against Iraq -- the proof of failure to allow inspectors in and failure to allow inspectors, once in, to conduct inspections in an unfettered manner.

Fortunately, President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy disagreed with the estimate and chose a course of action less ambitious and aggressive than recommended by their advisers.

I do believe we have to understand why reality turned out to be different than expectations and estimates. But you have more public service - certainly many of you - than I have ever had, and you recognize that this is not unusual.

And let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Analysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the political agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is a wrong explanation.

At this point we have found substantial evidence of an intent of senior level Iraqi officials, including Saddam, to continue production at some future point in time of weapons of mass destruction.

There's no way that that would have been discovered by normal international inspections. I couldn't have done it. My successors couldn't have done it.

a huge country with a lot to do.

Sen. Edward Kennedy knows very directly. Senator Kennedy and I talked on several occasions prior to the war that my view was that the best evidence that I had seen was that Iraq indeed had weapons of mass destruction.

I think the aim - and certainly the aim of what I've tried to do since leaving - is not political and certainly not a witch hunt at individuals. It's to try to direct our attention at what I believe is a fundamental fault analysis that we must now examine.

Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here.

But I do think the survey group - and I think Charlie Duelfer is a great leader. I have the utmost confidence in Charles. I think you will get as full an answer as you can possibly get.